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THE LAWYER’S “PRISONER’S DILEMMA”:
DUTY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN POSTCONVICTION
INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS
Jenna C. Newmark*
Many criminal defendants who face significant sentences and are
unsuccessful on appeal petition for collateral habeas corpus relief. One
common ground for postconviction relief is that defense counsel was
unconstitutionally ineffective before, during, or after trial. This presents an
ethical dilemma for those defense attorneys who have withdrawn from
representation and are accused of being ineffective. Should an accused
lawyer disclose confidential client information to the prosecution in selfdefense against these claims? Or should the lawyer, even in the face of
attacks on his work, help his former client in substantiating ineffectiveness
claims? Lawyers and courts must balance the competing interests that
underlie the relevant Model Rules of Professional Conduct (or
corresponding ethical rules in each jurisdiction) to determine which course
of action is appropriate.
Some courts permit (or even require) trial counsel to disclose
confidential client information in defense against ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Such disclosures may be justified because, under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer’s duty to keep client information
confidential may be limited by an ability to defend himself against charges
of wrongful conduct.
However, some commentators argue that,
notwithstanding attacks on his work, a lawyer accused of ineffectiveness
should not exercise his right to self-defense and should instead provide
information to his former client to help substantiate ineffectiveness claims.
This Note examines both theories of a lawyer’s role in the postconviction
context and concludes that trial counsel should not invoke the
confidentiality duty’s self-defense exception to respond to ineffectiveness
claims. The interests that underlie the confidentiality duty are paramount
and should not be undermined in response to claims that pose little threat to
a lawyer’s career. Additionally, this Note argues that a lawyer has a
limited duty to turn over files and documents relating to representation to
his former client.

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Brown University.
I would like to thank Professor Bruce Green for his insight and encouragement. I also would
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INTRODUCTION
Joseph J. Kindler was sentenced to death after being convicted of firstdegree murder.1 After his conviction was upheld by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and his state petition for postconviction relief was denied,
Kindler filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court.2 Among the grounds
1. See Kindler v. Horn, 542 F.3d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating the facts of Kindler’s
trial).
2. See id. at 73–75. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), “a district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
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for relief was a claim that his trial lawyer, Daniel-Paul Alva, was ineffective
during the sentencing phase.3 Alva submitted an affidavit in which he
admitted to his own ineffectiveness, stating that, due to inexperience, he did
not conduct a proper pre-sentencing investigation.4 Based in part on Alva’s
affidavit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus and order for a new
sentence.5
Similarly, Jonathan Kyle Binney was also convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.6 After an unsuccessful appeal,7 Binney petitioned for
postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance during trial and sentencing phases.8 Binney’s trial lawyer met
with the South Carolina Attorney General’s office to discuss the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims against him.9 At the meeting, trial counsel
made a copy of Binney’s entire file and submitted it to the Attorney
General’s office for review, which then used the file’s contents to counter
Binney’s petition.10 The South Carolina Supreme Court denied Binney’s
application for relief and upheld his sentence.11
As these two cases demonstrate, lawyers react differently when former
clients accuse them of rendering ineffective assistance. If a lawyer wishes
to defend against ineffectiveness claims, the self-defense exception to the
ethical confidentiality rule seems to permit him to do so.12 However, his
ability to defend his own self-interest is limited by his ethical obligations to
his former client.13
After a criminal defendant has been convicted and has exhausted his right
to an appeal, he may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which would
vacate his sentence.14 Many such defendants seek postconviction relief on
the grounds that their lawyers rendered ineffective assistance,15 thus

judgment of a State court . . . on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). For an indepth discussion of habeas corpus proceedings, see infra Part I.A.
3. Kindler, 542 F.3d at 75–76.
4. See id. at 84.
5. See id. at 90.
6. See State v. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418, 419–21 (S.C. 2005) (describing the facts
leading to Binney’s conviction).
7. See id. at 421.
8. See Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478, 479 (S.C. 2009) (reviewing Binney’s petition
for postconviction relief).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 479–80.
11. See id. at 481.
12. See infra Part I.B.1 for an explanation of the confidentiality rule and its self-defense
exception and Part II.A for a discussion of courts that permit lawyers to defend against
ineffectiveness claims.
13. See infra Part I.B.2 for an explanation of a lawyer’s duties to former clients and Part
II.B for the view that a lawyer may not provide extrajudicial information to the prosecution
and should provide substantial assistance to successor defense counsel.
14. See infra Part I.A for an explanation of postconviction habeas corpus relief.
15. See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of
ineffectiveness claims in habeas petitions).
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depriving them of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.16 Criminal
defense trial counsel respond to such claims in two ways: (1) they
cooperate with the prosecution in order to defend against attacks on their
work, or (2) they provide substantial assistance to successor defense
counsel. The choice is crucial because the lawyer’s cooperation often bears
heavily on the claim’s success—the defendant probably will not prevail if
his former lawyer “vigorously contests” the allegations, but is much more
likely to succeed with the lawyer’s assistance.17
Part I of this Note explores the background of postconviction
proceedings and the various ethical duties lawyers owe to their former
clients. Specifically, Part I discusses the duties articulated by the American
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model
Rules)18 and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (the
Restatement).19 Part II presents the different opinions as to whether trial
counsel ought to assist successor counsel or whether he may assist the
prosecution. Part III argues that, because of a lawyer’s ethical duties to
former clients and important public policy concerns, trial counsel should
not assist the prosecution by defending against ineffectiveness allegations
outside of court. Part III also argues that the self-defense exception to the
ethical duty of confidentiality should not apply to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Part III concludes that trial counsel has the duty to provide
at least some information to successor defense counsel, but that he is not
required to provide more assistance than handing over the file.
I. POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICAL DUTIES
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to the
assistance of counsel in defending against criminal charges.20 The U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean not only a right to the assistance
of counsel, but a right to the effective assistance of counsel.21 If a defendant
believes his lawyer failed to effectively represent him, the defendant may
16. See infra Part I.A for the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as the right to effective assistance of counsel.
17. Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong Rights We
Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7 (1995) (stating that, because defendants are
collaterally estopped from bringing malpractice claims against their former lawyer if the
defendant does not prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claims, trial counsel has an
incentive to contest such claims); see also Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of
Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 27
(explaining that a defendant is more likely to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim if aided by
former counsel).
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009).
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
21. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (“[A] party whose counsel is unable to
provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.”);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (interpreting the right to assistance
of counsel as the right to effective assistance of counsel); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 76 (1942) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective
assistance of counsel).
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move to vacate his sentence in a postconviction petition, claiming that the
ineffective assistance was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.22 How a lawyer participates in the postconviction process is
determined by the lawyer’s own interpretation, or the reviewing court’s
interpretation, of a lawyer’s ethical duties to former clients. This section
will describe the postconviction process, ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, and the ethical duties a lawyer generally owes his clients after
representation ends.
A. Postconviction Claims and the Strickland Standard
After a court has rendered a conviction and imposed a sentence, a
defendant may appeal the court’s decision.23 If the appeal is unsuccessful,
the defendant may further challenge a conviction through collateral
remedies in state and federal courts.24 Modern collateral remedies are
derived from common law writs of habeas corpus, by which defendants
would seek relief by filing a civil suit against the warden of the prison in
which they were being held.25
Today, a federal defendant may move to vacate a sentence “upon the
ground that [it violated] the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was [excessive], or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”26
Similarly, a state defendant may seek habeas corpus relief in federal court if
he believes his conviction is unconstitutional or violates federal law.27

22. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (5th ed. 2009). The
denial of effective assistance of counsel constitutes a constitutional violation, a claim that a
defendant may allege during a collateral proceeding. See id. (explaining that ineffective
assistance violates the Sixth Amendment). Additionally, indigent defendants have the right
to court-appointed counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963)
(affording the right to court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (holding that the defendants’ inability to retain private counsel
did not constitute a waiver of the right to counsel).
23. While there is no federal constitutional right to appeal a judgment, statutes and state
constitutional provisions grant the right to appeal in all felony cases. See LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 22, § 27.1 (discussing the history of appellate review).
24. Id. at § 28.1 (explaining collateral remedies); see also Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 682–83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing collateral remedies as “an
avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final”).
25. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 28.1.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
27. See id. § 2254(a) (“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.”). For state prisoners to pursue a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, they
must first exhaust all available state remedies. Id.; see also Eve Brensike Primus, A
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (describing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254).
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Habeas review is especially common for death penalty cases,28 because a
defendant whose motion is successful receives a retrial.29
One of the most common grounds for habeas relief30 is that a defendant
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel before, during, or after trial.31 Ineffective assistance
of counsel claims typically arise on collateral appeal—rather than direct
appeal—because direct appellate review may consider only the trial record,
and ineffectiveness claims require an analysis of more than just the trial
record.32
It is extremely difficult and uncommon for one to prevail on an
ineffectiveness claim under the standard announced in Strickland v.
Washington.33 In Strickland, the Supreme Court articulated the test that

28. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 28.2(d) (explaining that collateral review has
been “particularly significant” for death sentences).
29. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (describing the retrial
remedy for successful habeas petitions); Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in
Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1653 (2008) (same).
30. See Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance
of Trial Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall
2009, at 6, 7; David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical
Obligations of Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF.
85, 91 (1999) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “virtually guaranteed”
for lawyers who represent capital defendants).
31. See generally JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL
DEFENSE PRACTICE § 10 (3d ed. 2005) (listing types of ineffective assistance claims).
Examples of ineffectiveness before trial include failure to move for change of venue; to
challenge an improperly obtained confession; to investigate witnesses; or to move to
suppress evidence. See id. §§ 10:17–10:29. Examples of ineffectiveness during trial include
failure to object to inadmissible or prejudicial evidence; to object to prosecutorial
misconduct; to properly cross-examine or call witnesses; or to submit proper jury
instructions. See id. §§ 10:30–10:56. Examples of ineffectiveness after trial include failure
to present mitigating evidence in a death penalty case; to bring appropriate post-trial
motions; or to raise certain issues on appeal. See id. §§ 10:48, 10:57–10:62.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 348 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to
evaluate the merits of defendant’s ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, noting that such
claims are properly analyzed through collateral review); United States v. Lampazianie, 251
F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be
reviewed on direct appeal when . . . it was not raised in the district court, because there has
been no opportunity to develop record evidence on the merits of the claim.”);
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa. 2002) (“[A]n overwhelming majority of
states indicate a general reluctance to entertain ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.”).
33. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986)
(noting that the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims announced in
Strickland v. Washington is “highly demanding”). Since the Strickland decision, many
commentators have criticized the standard for making it too difficult for defendants to
prevail on ineffectiveness claims. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 17, at 19 (noting that,
because of the strong presumption of attorney competence, Strickland challenges are
“exceedingly difficult to win”); Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Wiggins v. Smith: The
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 764 (2004) (discussing the criticism surrounding Strickland and
concluding that the test has “detrimentally affected” criminal defendants); Martin C.
Calhoun, Comment, How To Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for
Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 414–15 (1988)
(criticizing the Strickland test for being “nearly insurmountable” and “unnecessarily harsh”).
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courts use to determine whether counsel was ineffective.34 In Strickland,
the defendant, David Washington, pleaded guilty to multiple charges of
kidnapping, robbery, and murder in a Florida trial court.35 Finding that the
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, a judge sentenced
Washington to death.36 After an unsuccessful appeal,37 Washington sought
collateral relief in state court, but was denied.38 He then petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, alleging, among other things, that his lawyer was ineffective in
previous proceedings.39
In reviewing Washington’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that, to
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas petitioner
must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.40 Courts need only determine that counsel comported with a basic
standard of competency, in light of “prevailing professional norms,” to find
a lawyer’s actions objectively reasonable.41 Thus, a defendant has a heavy
burden to prove that counsel’s errors were so egregious that he was not
functioning as “counsel” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,42

This criticism, though prevalent in commentary, is not the subject of this Note but highlights
the obstacles habeas petitioners must overcome.
34. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (articulating a two-prong test to determine
whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance).
35. See id. at 671–72.
36. See id. at 672–75.
37. See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 667 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (upholding
Washington’s convictions and sentences), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
38. See Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286–87 (Fla. 1981) (affirming the trial
court’s denial of postconviction relief).
39. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678.
40. See id. at 687–95 (establishing the two-prong test); see also Knowles v. Mirzayance,
129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (“Strickland requires a defendant to establish deficient
performance and prejudice.”); Graham, supra note 29, at 1653 (describing the two prongs of
the Strickland test as the “essential elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim”).
41. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (noting that courts should look at “whether, in light
of all the circumstances, the [alleged] acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance”); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)
(explaining that, while there are no “specific guidelines” for adequate attorney performance,
courts should look at “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (“[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms . . . .” (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89)).
42. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,
146–47 (2006) (explaining that ineffective assistance of counsel violates the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel); Christopher M. Johnson, Not for Love or Money: Appointing
a Public Defender To Litigate a Claim of Ineffective Assistance Involving Another Public
Defender, 78 MISS. L.J. 69, 75 (2008) (observing that, under Strickland, a defendant must
show that his lawyer’s performance was “very poor indeed” to make a successful
ineffectiveness claim). The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to the assistance
of counsel in criminal proceedings, but the right to the effective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying discussion of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the right to counsel.
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and that the acts or omissions were not the result of a valid strategy.43 The
inquiry must be “highly deferential” to the accused lawyer’s performance
and presume that counsel exercised adequate professional judgment.44
A court may dispense with the reasonableness inquiry and consider the
prejudice prong first.45 To show prejudice, a defendant must establish that
there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the proceeding would have yielded a different result.46
Prejudice rests on whether the attorney’s performance undermined the
confidence and overall fairness of the proceeding,47 although courts should
presume that the proceeding was fair.48 With strong presumptions of
attorney competence and fairness to overcome, it is very difficult for a
defendant to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim.49
The Strickland Court imposed a high standard to discourage
ineffectiveness challenges.50 If the standard were less deferential to
attorney performance, “[c]riminal trials resolved unfavorably to the
defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial,”

43. See Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1421 (explaining that a lawyer’s decisions resulting from
thorough investigation are “virtually unchallengeable” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690));
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.10(c) (explaining that courts must give great deference
to counsel’s strategic choices, so long as the lawyer completely investigated the case).
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Duncan, supra note 17, at 21–22 (noting the
strong presumption that a lawyer acted within the wide range of reasonable professional
conduct); Johnson, supra note 42, at 74–75.
45. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed.”); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 (explaining that a
constitutional violation is not complete unless the lawyer’s mistakes actually prejudice the
defense). But see Calhoun, supra note 33, at 430–31 (criticizing Strickland for permitting
courts to consider prejudice before attorney performance); Duncan, supra note 17, at 20–21
(same).
46. See Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1422 (“To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim,
Mirzayance must show . . . that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have
prevailed on his insanity defense had he pursued it.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694));
Graham, supra note 29, at 1654 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “[S]ome conceivable
effect on the outcome” is insufficient to establish prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
47. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (defining “reasonable probability” as “a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in” the proceeding’s outcome). The Strickland Court
emphasized that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is actually an attack on the
fundamental fairness of the challenged proceeding, so the inquiry should focus primarily on
whether the defendant received a fair trial. See id. at 687, 697; see also Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395 (1986) (explaining that the prejudice prong of the Strickland
test rests on whether the outcome of the proceeding was “fundamentally unfair”); Graham,
supra note 29, at 1653–54 (discussing the necessity of finding a link between the lawyer’s
performance and the trial’s fairness).
48. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the
assumption that the decision maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying
the standards that govern the decision.”); Duncan, supra note 17, at 16–17 (explaining that
the Strickland Court emphasized that lower courts should presume that trials are reliable).
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; HALL, supra note 31, § 10:1 (“[T]he prospect of
defending unjustified ineffective assistance claims filed by disgruntled convicted clients can
have a chilling effect on zealous advocacy.”).
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undermining judicial finality and efficiency.51 Widespread scrutiny of trial
counsel’s performance would also discourage attorneys from accepting
defense cases, particularly capital cases.52
If a reviewing court decides the defendant has made a colorable
ineffectiveness claim in his petition, it may choose to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel’s actions or
omissions were the result of valid strategy or mere incompetency.53 The
decision to conduct a hearing rests on whether “a hearing could enable an
applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”54 Evidentiary hearings are
rare in both capital and non-capital cases.55 During an evidentiary hearing,
a court may find it necessary to inquire into the nature of counsel’s
communications with the defendant to make a proper determination about
trial counsel’s performance and may call the trial lawyer as a witness to
testify about his decisions before, during, and after trial.56
Usually, if a defendant does not prevail on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, he is collaterally estopped from bringing a subsequent legal
malpractice claim against the same lawyer he accused of being
ineffective.57 Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, successful or not, does not subject the accused attorney to
a disciplinary proceeding.58
51. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; HALL, supra note 31, § 10:1 (warning that, if courts
consistently find lawyers ineffective, there will never be finality).
52. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; HALL, supra note 31, § 10:1 (explaining that
widespread success for ineffectiveness claims would discourage criminal defense attorneys
from accepting cases).
53. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2007) (explaining how courts
considering federal habeas petitions determine when evidentiary hearings are appropriate).
Evidentiary hearings are unnecessary where the record clearly refutes any factual allegations
found in the habeas corpus petition and may not be conducted if barred by statute. See
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474–75 (listing federal cases that have found no evidentiary hearing is
required where the factual allegations in the petition are contrary to the facts contained in the
record).
54. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474 (citing Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.
2000)), 481 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct
an evidentiary hearing because “[e]ven assuming the truth of all the facts Landrigan sought
to prove at the evidentiary hearing, he still could not be granted federal habeas relief”).
55. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 28.7.
56. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (explaining that a court may find the inquiry critical
to a thorough assessment of counsel’s trial or appellate strategy); see also Duncan, supra
note 17, at 27 (“A successful [ineffectiveness] claim often inquires into defense counsel’s
conversations and interactions with the defendant.”); Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of
Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 63 (2009) (noting that trial
counsel’s testimony is usually crucial to the ineffectiveness determination).
57. See HALL, supra note 31, §§ 10:2, 31:16; Duncan, supra note 17, at 27; Koniak,
supra note 17, at 7 (discussing how the collateral estoppel rule incentivizes former counsel
to defend against ineffective assistance of counsel allegations).
58. See, e.g., In re Steven Dean Applegate, Commission No. 96 SH 90, 1997 WL
713726, at *11–13 (June 30, 1997) (declining to professionally discipline a lawyer who was
found to have rendered ineffective assistance); Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the
Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1125–26 (1999) (“[I]neffective or incompetent counsel
may have little to fear from state ethics boards.”).
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B. Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations to Former Clients
Although a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as
grounds for postconviction relief will retain new counsel or represent
himself, trial counsel still has a continuing duty to protect his former
client’s interests.59 This section will describe the duties a lawyer owes his
client after their formal relationship ends. Part I.B.1 examines the duty of
confidentiality owed to a former client and Part I.B.2 examines the duty to
provide information to the former client. The Model Rules60 and the
Restatement61 guide lawyers and courts on these ethical duties.
The Model Rules originated with the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted in 1908, and later, the
Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code), adopted in 1969.62 The
ABA adopted the Code as private law, governing lawyers who were
members of the ABA.63 In 1978, the ABA changed the title of these rules
to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code),
acknowledging that they served only as a model for state and federal courts
and were not binding law.64 The ABA was able to persuade state and
federal courts to adopt the Model Code as rules of the court.65 Even in
states where the Model Code was not officially adopted, courts treated it as
evidence of the law.66 In 1983, the Model Rules, which have since replaced
the Model Code, became effective, and many jurisdictions adopted them as
law.67 Those jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Rules as law
view them as persuasive authority.68 The ABA has amended the Rules
several times since 1983.69
Like the Model Rules, the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers is a resource that lawyers and judges use to
59. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2009) (duties to former clients);
id. R. 1.16 (duties upon termination); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 33 (2000) (duties upon termination). See also Siegel, supra note 30, at 95–96
(discussing lawyers’ duties to former clients in criminal cases).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33.
62. See MARGARET RAYMOND, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAW PRACTICE 11 (2009)
(providing a history of the Model Rules); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE, § 1-1(d) (2009) (same).
63. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(d).
64. See RAYMOND, supra note 62, at 11 (“The Model Code, like any model statute, was
not the law anywhere—the ABA has no power to impose rules of professional responsibility
on any jurisdiction.”).
65. See id. at 11 (“In the years following its adoption by the ABA, many states adopted
Model Code-based rules of professional conduct.”); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note
62, § 1-1(d) (“The ABA was quite successful in persuading state and federal courts to adopt
its Model Code as law, an enacted rule of court.”).
66. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(d).
67. See Ria A. Tabacco, Defensible Ethics: A Proposal to Revise the ABA Model Rules
for Criminal Defense Lawyer-Authors, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 568, 573 (2008) (“Most state
courts adopt the Model Rules with some modifications.”).
68. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(e)(4).
69. See RAYMOND, supra note 62, at 12 (discussing changes to the Model Rules since
their initial adoption in 1983); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(e)–(f)
(same).
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determine what the law is.70 However, unlike the Model Rules, the
Restatement was not intended to be adopted as rules of the court.71 Rather,
the Restatement is a series of principles that covers an array of areas that
affect the practice of law.72 It aims to “nudge the developing case law in a
particular direction,” and influence courts in interpreting the Model Rules.73
Both the Model Rules and the Restatement impose duties after the formal
attorney-client relationship ends.74
1. Confidentiality
One of the most fundamental duties a lawyer owes to a former client is a
duty to keep the former client’s confidences.75 A lawyer’s duty to keep a
client’s secrets is apparent in the ethical rule of confidentiality,76 the
attorney-client privilege,77 and the work product doctrine.78
Confidentiality principles are rooted in agency law, by which a lawyer,
the agent, acts on behalf of the client, the principal.79 According to agency
law, an agent has a duty not to use or reveal the principal’s confidential
information.80 An agent’s duty to keep the principal’s confidences
continues even after the agency relationship ends.81
a. The Ethical Duty of Confidentiality
A lawyer’s duties to former clients include the confidentiality duty owed
to current clients.82 Nearly every American jurisdiction has professional
70. See RAYMOND, supra note 62, at 17.
71. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-3(a).
72. See id.
73. See id. (describing the Restatement’s purpose).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (2000).
75. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.1 (Student ed. 1986)
(“[T]he principle of the confidentiality of client information is well-embedded in the
traditional notion of the . . . client-lawyer relationship.”); Michael H. Berger & Katie A.
Reilly, The Duty of Confidentiality: Legal Ethics and the Attorney-Client and Work Product
Privileges, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2009, at 35, 35 (“Confidentiality is a fundamental tenet of the
attorney-client relationship.”).
76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (governing confidentiality). For a
discussion of the ethical duty of confidentiality and the difference between the ethical duty
of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, see infra Part I.B.1.b.
77. See infra Part I.B.1.b.
78. See infra Part I.B.1.c.
79. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 250 (1943) (finding
the principles underlying attorney-client confidentiality rules in agency law (citing 2 PHILIP
R. MECHEM, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY, §§ 2297, 2313 (2d ed. 1898))); Fred
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 361 (1989) (“At the heart of
attorney-client confidentiality rules is the notion that lawyers are clients’ agents, and often
their fiduciaries.”).
80. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006).
81. See id. § 8.05 cmt. c (“An agent’s duties concerning confidential information do not
end when the agency relationship terminates. An agent is not free to . . . disclose a
principal’s . . . confidential information whether the agent maintains a physical record of
them or retains them in the agent’s memory.”).
82. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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rules that prohibit lawyers from disclosing confidential client information.83
Model Rule 1.6 governs a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, stating that “[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent”84 or unless one of the rule’s
exceptions apply.85 The ethical duty of confidentiality requires a lawyer to
protect his client’s confidences at all times, both in and out of court.86
Information is protected regardless of whether it is public and regardless of
whether disclosure would harm the client or not.87 A lawyer has a duty to
protect his former client’s confidences in the same way he would a current
client’s confidences because the duty of confidentiality lasts forever.88
Model Rule 1.9 governs a lawyer’s duties to former clients.89 Under
Rule 1.9(a), a lawyer has a duty to avoid conflicts of interest between
former and current clients without the former client’s written informed
consent.90 More importantly, Rule 1.9(c) provides that a lawyer may not
reveal information relating to a former client’s representation “except as
these Rules would permit or require with respect to a [current] client.”91
This part of Rule 1.9(c) implicates Model Rule 1.6, which outlines the duty
of confidentiality a lawyer has to current clients.92 Similarly, the
83. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 352 (explaining that professional codes in almost
every American jurisdiction forbid attorneys to disclose client information, and that codes
range from “nearly absolute prohibitions on attorney disclosures to general rules containing
significant exceptions”).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009); see also Patrick Shilling, Attorney
Papers, History and Confidentiality: A Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 1.6, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 2741, 2742 (2001) (describing Model Rule 1.6).
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b). For a discussion of when a lawyer
may reveal a client’s confidences, see infra Part I.B.1.d, which discusses exceptions to the
confidentiality rule.
86. See Shilling, supra note 84, at 2743.
87. Model Rule 1.6 does not contain an exception for public information; it simply
protects all information related to representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6(a); See also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.7.2; Bruce A. Green, The Market for Bad
Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s Experiment in Professional Regulation, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1605, 1634 n.126 (2008) (“Even publicly available information is subject to the
confidentiality duty . . . .”).
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [18] (“The duty of
confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.” (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(2))); see also Prisco v. Westgate Entm’t, Inc., 799 F.
Supp. 266, 270–71 (D. Conn. 1992) (noting that Model Rule 1.9 protects confidences after
representation ends).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2009) (outlining duties owed to a
former client).
90. Id. R. 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person’s interests are materially adverse to [those] of the former client . . . .”).
91. Id. R. 1.9(c); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
01-424 (2001) (“[A] principal obligation[] of a lawyer to her former client [is] to continue to
maintain the confidentiality of the client information learned during the course of the
representation . . . .”).
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (confidentiality); see also GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 461 (4th ed. 2005) (“[Rule 1.9]
is a reminder that the lawyer also has a continuing duty of confidentiality to a former
client.”).
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Restatement describes duties to a client upon termination of a formal
attorney-client relationship,93 providing that an attorney must refrain from
using or disclosing client information.94 These ethical duties are essential
to making a determination about the proper course of action for former trial
counsel during the postconviction process.95
The Restatement also provides that a lawyer may not use or disclose
confidential information during and after representation “if there is a
reasonable prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of
the client.”96 During representation, a lawyer must take reasonable steps to
“protect confidential . . . information against impermissible use or
Upon termination of the attorney-client
disclosure” by others.97
relationship, a lawyer may not take advantage of a former client by
“abusing knowledge or trust” gained through representation and may not
use or reveal client information if doing so would harm a client’s material
interests.98
The purpose of this duty is to foster trust between lawyers and their
clients, encouraging clients to fully disclose all information related to the
course of representation.99 Client disclosure is important because it permits
an attorney to make informed decisions about how to proceed with the
representation.100 Maintaining confidentiality is especially important in
cases involving indigent defendants, who are less likely to trust their courtappointed counsel.101
b. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The ethical confidentiality duty encompasses the attorney-client
The attorney-client privilege is a construction of an
privilege.102

93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (2000).
94. See id.
95. See infra Parts II–III.
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(1)(a) (2000)
(describing the duty to safeguard confidences).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 33.
99. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 54 (1998) (“The purpose of
confidentiality safeguards, of course, is to induce clients to make disclosures to lawyers.”);
see also Zacharias, supra note 79, at 364 (“A client who expects the lawyer to reveal
embarrassing or damaging facts may not be willing to tell all.”).
100. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 358 (“By encouraging clients to communicate
information they would otherwise withhold from their lawyers, confidentiality enhances the
quality of legal representation and thus helps produce accurate legal verdicts.”).
101. See Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference it Makes,
11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 119 (2003) (“Clients who are unable to choose [their counsel]
because they cannot pay for their own lawyer are more likely to be unsophisticated about the
law, to feel more alienated in a legal setting, and to believe that their lawyer is not really
working for them.”). Ineffectiveness claims are most often brought by indigent defendants,
so preserving trust and confidence is particularly important in such cases.
102. See Louima v. City of New York, No. 98 CV 5083(SJ), 2004 WL 2359943, at *71
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2004) (finding the ethical confidentiality rule “broader than the common
law [privilege] in that it deals not only with confidential attorney client communications but
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evidentiary rule by which a lawyer may refuse to disclose or a client may
prevent disclosure of communications between them in court.103 There are
two important distinctions between the ethical duty and the testamentary
privilege.104 First, the attorney-client privilege only applies whenever a
lawyer may be called as a witness in judicial proceedings, whereas the
ethical rule “applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought
from the lawyer through compulsion of law.”105 Second, the privilege only
protects communications between an attorney and his client, unlike the
ethical duty, which protects any information related to representation.106
Like the ethical duty of confidentiality,107 the attorney-client privilege
protects communications indefinitely, even after the client’s death.108
The privilege is supported by the same policy concerns that underlie the
ethical duty of confidentiality. Knowing that the privilege will protect
communications between the client and his lawyer, the client will be
encouraged to disclose to the lawyer everything relating to the particular
course of representation.109 A client’s full disclosure allows an attorney to
perform to the best of his abilities by ensuring that he will have all of the
information available to make an informed, professional judgment about
how to represent his client.110
secrets as well”), aff’d sub nom. Roper-Simpson v. Scheck, 163 Fed. App’x 70 (2d Cir.
2006).
103. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states the general rule of privileges. See FED. R. EVID.
501. The rule recognizes privileges prescribed by the Constitution, federal laws, rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and general principles of common law. See id. Professor
John Henry Wigmore’s familiar formulation of the attorney-client privilege is:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed., 1961).
104. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.7 (explaining the difference between the scope of
the ethical rule of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege); Shilling, supra note 84,
at 2743 (same).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3] (2009) (distinguishing the
attorney-client privilege from the ethical rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68–86 (2000) (expanding on the attorney-client privilege).
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3]; see also WOLFRAM, supra
note 75, § 6.7.2.
107. For an explanation of a lawyer’s duties after the attorney-client relationship ends, as
dictated by Model Rule 1.9(c), see supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
108. See Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 404–07 (1998) (holding that
the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client).
109. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (acknowledging that the
privilege’s purpose “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients”); SIMON, supra note 99, at 54.
110. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“[S]ound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and . . . such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the
client.”); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (noting that the privilege “is founded
upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law . . . which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when
free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”); In re Grand Jury
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Under certain circumstances, the attorney-client privilege may be
waived.111 The right to waive the privilege rests solely with the client.112
Waiver may be expressly stated or implied by the client’s conduct.113
Examples of implied waiver include when a client discloses otherwise
privileged information to a third party,114 when a client uses the privileged
information in court through testimony,115 or when a defendant makes an
allegation against his lawyer that calls into question the client’s
conversations with his lawyer.116 One such situation is when a defendant
files a habeas petition and raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims on
the basis that his lawyer gave improper advice.117 As will be discussed in
Parts II and III, when the client disputes communications with his lawyer by
claiming his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance, the extent of the waiver
is often unclear.118

Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 530–32 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the important public policy
concerns the attorney-client privilege serves).
111. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 103, § 2327 (explaining waiver).
112. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.3.4 (“The duty to invoke the privilege . . . is
defined . . . by the client’s own rights.”).
113. See Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a client
may either expressly or impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege); see also RAYMOND,
supra note 62, at 191 (offering an example of when a client impliedly waives the privilege).
114. See generally In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006). In
Qwest, a corporation had produced documents to government agencies to aid in an
investigation, but then refused to provide the same documents to the plaintiffs in a securities
class action suit, claiming that the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
See id. at 1181–82. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that
the corporation had “selectively waived” the privilege and held that the privilege is waived
when the client voluntarily discloses otherwise confidential information to an unprivileged
third party. See id. at 1192, 1201.
115. See, e.g., Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470–71. In Hunt, a civil action, the defendant offered
testimony that included advice her attorney gave her. See id. When her attorney offered his
account of their conversations, his client objected, claiming that their conversations were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 470. The Supreme Court found that,
when the defendant testified about her attorney’s advice, she waived the privilege and thus
the right to object to the attorney’s testimony about their conversations. See id. at 470–71.
116. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1178 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the privilege
waived when one “‘injects into this litigation an issue that requires testimony from [his]
attorneys or testimony concerning the reasonableness of [his] attorney’s conduct’” (quoting
GAB Bus Servs., Inc. v. Syndicate 627, 809 F.2d 755, 762 (11th Cir. 1987))).
117. See United States v. Sharp, No. 2:07CR19, 2009 WL 1867619, at *1 (N.D. W. Va.
June 29, 2009) (holding that the defendant’s collateral attack on his attorney’s performance
“squarely puts his attorney-client relationship with his trial attorneys at issue” and that the
defendant thus impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to his
conversations with those lawyers); see also Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th
Cir. 1974) (explaining that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an attack on a
lawyer’s work and an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege); Laughner v. United
States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The privilege is not an inviolable seal upon the
attorney’s lips. . . . [Where] the client alleges a breach of duty to him by the attorney, we
have not the slightest scruple about deciding that he thereby waives the privilege as to all
[relevant] communications . . . .”). For an in-depth discussion of ineffectiveness claims
waiving the attorney client privilege, see infra Part II.A.2.
118. See Part II.A.2 (examining cases where courts find ineffective assistance of counsel
claims effect broad waivers of the attorney-client privilege that extend to information
generally protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality).
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c. The Work Product Doctrine
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine gives effect
to confidentiality principles. The work product doctrine, which is separate
from the attorney-client privilege,119 protects from discovery an attorney’s
work relating to representation.120 Work product is written work produced
in anticipation of litigation, including “its intangible equivalent in unwritten
or oral form.”121 Like attorney-client communications, work product is
protected because a lawyer will be most candid in his work if he knows it
will be immune from discovery by the opposing party.122 Uninhibited trial
preparation facilitates truth-seeking, the ultimate goal of the criminal justice
system.123 Work product is protected throughout litigation, unless the
opposing side makes a showing of necessity to overcome these
protections,124 or the client waives work product immunity.125
d. Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality
A lawyer’s duty to protect confidential client information is not
absolute.126 Model Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to reveal information
protected under the confidentiality duty in certain extraordinary
circumstances.127 Under the confidentiality rule’s self-defense exception, a
119. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975) (acknowledging that the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are separate protections); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (same).
120. See generally Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (establishing the work product doctrine). See
also Nobles, 422 U.S. at 236–40 (applying the work product doctrine in the criminal
context); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87(3) (2000) (“[W]ork
product is immune from discovery or other compelled disclosure . . . when the immunity is
invoked . . . .”).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87(1) (defining work
product); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (same).
122. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510–11 (noting that, as an officer of the court, a lawyer
has the duty to advance justice, which is best done when a lawyer enjoys a high degree of
privacy in his work); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 142 (D. Mass. 2004)
(“[T]here is a need to protect the privacy of the attorney’s mental processes.”).
123. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238 (“The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a
fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case.”);
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (warning that, if work product were made available to the
opposing party, “[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in
the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. . . . [a]nd the interests of
the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 58 (Conn. 1999) (discussing the “detrimental effect” a “threat
of disclosure” would have on the lawyer’s ability to effectively advocate for his client)
(citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511)).
124. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.6.3.
125. See id. § 6.6.2.
126. See Henry D. Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the
Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 783 (1977).
127. An attorney may reveal some information relating to representation to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; to prevent the client from committing a
crime or fraud; to seek legal advice about compliance with the Model Rules; to defend
oneself; and to comply with a law or court order. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
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lawyer may reveal client information “to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client . . .
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s
representation of the client.”128 Disclosures are permitted only to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to protect his own self interest.129
If a lawyer does reasonably believe it is necessary to make disclosures in
connection with a judicial proceeding, he should make such disclosures “in
a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other
persons having a need to know it” and should take measures to protect the
confidential information.130 The Restatement also recognizes exceptions to
the confidentiality rule, including an exception to protect a lawyer’s selfinterest when a client brings or threatens to bring a charge of wrongful
conduct.131 Like the Model Rules, the Restatement allows disclosure only
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to defend against
such a charge.132 While the self-defense exception permits some disclosure
when the lawyer and client are adverse to each other in some way, the
lawyer may not “rummage through every file he has on that particular client
. . . and to publicize any confidential communication he comes across [that]
may tend to impeach his former client. . . . [T]he probative value of the
disclosed material [must] be great enough to outweigh the potential damage
[of] disclosure.”133
There are a limited number of situations in which a lawyer may wish to
reveal information under the self-defense exception.134 These situations
include civil malpractice claims,135 an action to recover a fee,136 a
R. 1.6(b)(1)–(6) (2009). It is important to note that all of the exceptions to the
confidentiality rule are discretionary, not mandatory. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. [15] (stating that the
rule permits but does not require disclosure under the excepted circumstances). See generally
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 265 (2006) (analyzing the difference between mandatory and permissive Model
Rules).
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5). Lawyers typically invoke this
exception before or during a lawsuit with a former client. See Levine, supra note 126, at 783.
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b), cmt. [14] (“In any case, a
disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to accomplish that purpose.”); Levine, supra note 126, at 793 (explaining
that, without the self-defense exception, lawyers will suffer injustice in some cases where
their own interests are at stake).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [14].
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000).
132. See id.
133. Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, 416 F. Supp. 876, 886–87 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (evaluating
the extent to which a lawyer may make disclosures in a situation where he is adverse to his
former client).
134. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. [10] (describing situations
where invoking the self-defense exception would be appropriate); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. c (same); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, §
6.7.8 (same).
135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [10]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. c; HALL, supra note 31, § 28:58 (listing situations
in which a lawyer may invoke the self-defense exception); Levine, supra note 126, at 783,
791 n.42 (examining malpractice cases in which courts permitted the defendant attorney to
make disclosures).
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disciplinary charge,137 a civil action brought by a third party,138 or any
other adverse proceeding, including collateral proceedings where
ineffective assistance of counsel claims arise.139 A lawyer need not wait
until charges are filed or a lawsuit commences to invoke the self-defense
exception.140
A lawyer may, however, invoke the self-defense exception only in
response to a legitimate threat to his interests. In Louima v. City of New
York,141 the court found that protecting one’s reputation does not warrant
the self-defense exception.142 Abner Louima was involved in criminal and
civil suits against several police officers who brutally beat him.143 Two of
Louima’s attorneys made statements to the press regarding Louima’s case
during representation and after withdrawing.144 The lawyers argued that
they were simply responding to and defending against public allegations
that they had engaged in misconduct.145 The self-defense exception to New
York’s confidentiality rule,146 they argued, justified such a response.147
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York rejected this
assertion and concluded that “[m]ere press reports” about an attorney’s
conduct do not justify disclosure of client information, even if those reports
are incorrect.148
The court also found that protecting one’s reputation is not the sort of
attorney self-interest the self-defense exception aims to protect, unlike an
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [11]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 65 (allowing disclosures in actions to recover a fee); see
also Nakasian v. Incontrade, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (interpreting
New York’s self-defense exception to permit disclosures in a dispute to collect a fee).
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [10]; see also In re Conduct of
Robeson, 652 P.2d 336, 346 (Or. 1982) (interpreting Oregon’s self-defense exception to
permit disclosure in response to a disciplinary charge).
138. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1196 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding that an attorney may disclose confidential information in response to
potential charges made by a third party); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Pittsburgh v.
Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon, & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that a
lawyer may reveal confidential documents in response to a lawsuit brought by a third party
other than the client).
139. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48, 53–54 (2d Cir.
1969) (permitting disclosure in response to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim),
vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Levine, supra note 126, at 791 (observing
that many cases in which the self-defense exception has been deemed proper involve
ineffective assistance of counsel claims made in postconviction petitions).
140. See, e.g., Meyerhofer, 497 F.2d at 1195–96 (permitting attorney’s disclosures when
threatened with a lawsuit, before a suit had been formally filed); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [10] (same).
141. No. 98 CV 5083(SJ), 2004 WL 2359943, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004), aff’d sub
nom. Roper-Simpson v. Scheck, 163 F. App’x 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
142. See id. at *76 (rejecting the notion that a lawyer may invoke the self-defense
reputation when he disclosed information to a newspaper to respond to public accusations of
misconduct).
143. See id. at *1.
144. See id. at *31–44 (detailing the lawyers’ disclosures to the press).
145. See id. at *73 (setting forth the lawyers’ defenses).
146. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 1200.19 (2007).
147. See Louima, 2004 WL 2359943, at *70.
148. Id. at *73.
THE
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action to recover a fee.149 This reasoning also appears in the Restatement’s
confidentiality exceptions.150 While the Model Rules do not explicitly
distinguish between the extent of disclosure permitted in different cases in
which the self-defense exception may apply, the comments to the
Restatement contemplate a notable difference in the permissible extent of
disclosure for fee cases and the permissible extent of disclosure in other
A lawyer may use or disclose confidential
self-defense cases.151
information to resolve a fee dispute to the extent reasonably necessary to
establish his claim for a fee152 because disclosures necessary to establish
such a claim will not involve information that would embarrass or prejudice
the client.153 For other self-defense purposes, disclosure is permitted only
if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes such disclosure is
necessary.154 The requirement of reasonable necessity does not permit
disclosure in response to “casual charges,” such as comments not likely to
be taken seriously by others.155
Another confidentiality exception that is relevant in the postconviction
process permits a lawyer to reveal information to comply with a court
order.156 As with the self-defense exception, a lawyer may disclose
information only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with the
court order.157 Courts may call the lawyer as a witness during an
evidentiary hearing to rule on an ineffectiveness claim, in which case a
lawyer will be required to testify about his course of representing his former
client.158 Although “a court order may supersede the lawyer’s obligation of
confidentiality under Rule 1.6, [this] does not mean that the lawyer should
be a passive bystander to attempts by a governmental agency—or by any
other person or entity, for that matter—to examine her files or records.”159
Thus, when faced with a subpoena or court order directing a lawyer to turn
over files relating to representation to a government entity, that lawyer has
the duty to “seek to limit the subpoena, or court order, on any legitimate
available grounds” to protect confidential information under Rule 1.6.160 A
lawyer must also make a good faith effort to limit his revelations to the
149. Id. at *70 (citing First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon, & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
150. See infra notes 310–13 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of the
difference between permissible revelations in actions to recover a fee and cases to defend
against accusations of wrongful conduct).
151. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009), with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 64–65 (2000).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 65 (providing a fee
dispute exception to the general confidentiality rule).
153. See id. § 65 cmt. b.
154. See id. § 64 cmt. e.
155. See id.
156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6).
157. See id. R. 1.6(b) cmt. [14]; see also supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text for an explanation of the use of
evidentiary hearings to evaluate the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
159. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 385 (1994)
(commenting on confidentiality obligations when a lawyer’s files are subpoenaed).
160. Id.
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extent reasonably necessary when testifying as a witness in an evidentiary
hearing.161
2. The Duty To Provide Information to a Former Client
A lawyer is obligated to protect his former client’s interests, not only by
keeping his confidences,162 but also by providing information, which is
considered client property, to his former client.163 The duty to provide
information to a former client, like the confidentiality duty, arises from
agency law.164 During the agency relationship, an agent has the duty to
“use due care to safeguard” the principal’s property165 and then return such
property to the principal upon termination.166
In line with this principle, Model Rule 1.16 requires that “[u]pon
termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests.”167 Even if a client
unfairly discharges his lawyer, the lawyer must “take all reasonable steps”
to ensure that termination does not adversely affect the client.168 These
steps include giving the client papers and property to which he is
entitled.169 This Rule is not absolute, however, as a lawyer may keep
client-related papers to the extent other law permits.170
The Restatement’s provisions relating to the duty to turn over property to
the client upon termination are similar to Model Rule 1.16.171 Under the
Restatement, upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, a lawyer
must surrender all property belonging to the client and, upon the client’s
request, “allow a client or former client to inspect and copy any document
possessed by the lawyer relating to the representation, unless substantial
grounds exist to refuse.”172 Substantial grounds to decline delivery exist if
161. See id.
162. For a discussion of the ethical duty of confidentiality, see supra Part I.B.1.a.
163. See, e.g., Olguin v. State Bar, 616 P.2d 858, 860–61 (Cal. 1980) (disciplining a
lawyer who failed to provide information and files to a former client’s successor counsel).
164. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the duty of
confidentiality derives from agency law.
165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12 cmt. b (2006) (describing an agent’s
duty of care towards the principal’s property).
166. See id. § 8.05 cmt. b (“Termination of an agency relationship does not end an agent’s
duties regarding property of the principal. A former agent who continues to possess property
of a principal has a duty to return it . . . .”).
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2009).
168. Id. R. 1.16 cmt. [9].
169. See id. R. 1.16(d) (“Upon termination of representation a lawyer shall . . . surrender[]
papers and property to which the client is entitled . . . .”); see also People v. Turner, Nos.
05PDJ080, 05PDJ083, 06PDJ089, 2006 WL 3353971, at *1 (Colo. O.P.D.J., Nov. 9, 2006)
(disciplining a lawyer who failed to return files to a former client); HALL, supra note 31, §
21:4.
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d).
171. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§§ 43–46 (2000) (governing clients’ property).
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 46(2); see also David
M. Siegel, The Role of Trial Counsel in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: Three
Questions To Keep in Mind, CHAMPION, Feb. 2009, at 14, 18–21.
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the client has not paid fees, for example, but only if withholding the
documents would not “unreasonably harm” the client.173
Most jurisdictions adhere to the Restatement’s view, or the “entire file”
standard, extending a client’s right to retrieve documents not only to the
client’s property placed in the lawyer’s possession, but to the client’s entire
file, including documents the lawyer produced.174 In one notable case,
Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn,175 the New
York Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement view176 and found that the
client’s property rights to these documents were superior to those of the
attorney.177 Upon withdrawal, the court concluded, a client should have
access to work product as well as end product.178
While this creates a presumption in favor of full access to the file, it
would be permissible to prevent access to firm documents intended solely
for internal use179 because, as some commentators assert, allowing lawyers
to retain internal documents furthers important policy objectives best served
by allowing lawyers to keep their work private.180 Such internal documents
include those containing an attorney’s general assessment of a client, and
preliminary or tentative impressions of issues recorded for the purpose of
giving internal direction to facilitate performance of legal services.181 This
exception protecting the secrecy of internal documents may be overcome by
court order, and “the lawyer’s duty to inform the client . . . can require the
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 43(1) (describing
situations in which it would be appropriate to retain client-related materials); id. § 46(4)
(“[A] lawyer may decline to deliver to a client or former client an original or copy of any
document under circumstances permitted by § 43(1).”).
174. See Fred C. Zacharias, Who Owns Work Product?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 127, 141
(citing Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d 879,
882 (N.Y. 1997)).
175. 689 N.E.2d 879, 882 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that counsel’s former client is entitled to
inspect and copy any documents which relate to representation and are in counsel’s
possession, absent substantial grounds for counsel to refuse access).
176. See id. at 882–83 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
43 (2000)). In deciding to adopt this view, the court compared the Restatement view, which
reflects the majority position, with the view adopted by a minority of jurisdictions. See id. A
minority of courts and ethics authorities classify work product as the attorney’s property, and
only require an attorney to turn over end product to the client. See id.; see also Siegel, supra
note 172, at 20 (discussing the different views of a former client’s access to his file and work
product); Zacharias, supra note 174, at 141 (discussing the minority view of work product).
Finding that the minority view “unfairly places the burden on the client to demonstrate a
need for specific work product documents in the . . . file,” the court rejected the minority
position in favor of the majority view, which presumes that the client is entitled to his entire
file when the attorney-client relationship terminates. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at
882–83.
177. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46 cmt. c.
178. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882.
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46, cmt. c.
180. Id. (“The need for lawyers to be able to set down their thoughts privately in order to
assure effective and appropriate representation warrants keeping such documents secret from
the client involved.”); see also supra notes 122–23 (discussing policy reasons for protecting
work product).
181. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 883.
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lawyer to disclose matters discussed in a document even when the
document itself need not be disclosed.”182
In the postconviction process, a lawyer also owes his former client a duty
of loyalty that is not explicit in the professional rules.183 Loyalty is an
“essential element[]” of the lawyer-client relationship.184 Like the
confidentiality duty and the duty to provide information to former
clients,185 the duty of loyalty exists in the fiduciary relationship between a
lawyer and his client186 and persists forever.187 A lawyer not only has the
duty to be loyal to his client, but he is also obligated to act as a zealous
advocate for the client’s interests.188 This implied duty of loyalty helps
inform the determination about predecessor counsel’s role during the
postconviction process.189
II. COMPETING VIEWS OF TRIAL COUNSEL’S ROLE DURING THE
POSTCONVICTION PROCESS
An ethical dilemma arises when, in a petition for postconviction relief,
the defendant, having retained new counsel, accuses his former attorney of
rendering ineffective assistance during trial, sentencing, or appeal.190 The
accused lawyer must consider the ethical duties described in Part I.B to
decide whether to cooperate with the prosecution and defend against
ineffective assistance of counsel claims or refrain from helping the
government and assist successor defense counsel instead. Very few courts
and commentators have directly addressed how to respond to
ineffectiveness claims. Of the few authorities that have done so, courts tend
to protect a lawyer’s right to serve his own self-interest by cooperating with
the prosecution,191 while commentators oppose this view, arguing that the
ethical duties mandate substantial assistance to successor defense
counsel.192 Part II.A presents the analysis of courts that permit or compel
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46, cmt. c.
183. See HALL, supra note 31, § 9:4 (“The duty of loyalty underlies all the ethical
rules . . . .”); WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 4.1; Siegel, supra note 30, at 105–106.
184. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. [1] (2009).
185. See supra notes 79–81, 164–66.
186. HALL, supra note 31, § 4:6 (“The relationship between an attorney and client is
highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character,
requiring a high degree of loyalty and good faith.”); Siegel, supra note 30, at 105.
187. See HALL, supra note 31, at §§ 4:6, 9:4.
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. [1] (“A lawyer must . . . act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that zealous advocacy is the
touchstone of the attorney-client relationship and the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653–57 (1984)
(explaining that effective assistance of counsel entails the defense vigorously advocating for
his client’s interests).
189. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 105–06 (considering the duty of loyalty when
concluding that trial counsel should assist successor defense counsel).
190. See Siegel, supra note 172, at 14 (identifying “conflicting ethical obligations” for
lawyers faced with ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
191. See infra Part II.A (discussing the judicial view).
192. See infra Part II.B (describing the commentator view).
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trial counsel to cooperate with the prosecution and defend against
ineffectiveness claims. Part II.B describes the commentary against
cooperation with the government and for assisting successor counsel.
A. An Informed Prosecution: The Judicial View
Generally, courts have both allowed and required trial counsel to assist
prosecution either through informal meetings or affidavits defending trial
counsel’s conduct.193 Defendants challenge this cooperation with the
prosecution by demanding a court order to prohibit counsel from doing
so194 or moving to suppress the evidence the prosecution gathered from
conversations with trial counsel.195 As this section explains, courts that
reject these challenges do so based on three theories: (1) that an
ineffectiveness claim triggers the self-defense exception to the
confidentiality duty,196 (2) that an ineffective assistance claim waives the
attorney-client privilege (and therefore ethical protections of confidential
material),197 or (3) that the court does not have the power to control trial
counsel’s ex parte conversations with the prosecution.198
1. Applying the Self-Defense Exception
Some courts permit trial counsel to broadly disclose confidential
information on the theory that a lawyer has the right to make such
disclosures to protect his own self-interest.199 When faced with an
ineffectiveness allegation, it is the “inevitable reflex” of an attorney to
defend himself.200 As discussed in Part I.B.1.b, Model Rule 1.6(b)(5)—the
self-defense exception to the confidentiality rule—allows a lawyer to
protect his own self-interest by revealing information where he reasonably
193. See, e.g., Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting trial
counsel to provide substantial information to the government); Wharton v. Calderon, 127
F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing informal meetings between the state and trial
counsel); State v. Lewis, 36 So. 3d 72, 80 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (granting the state access
to trial counsel’s documents upon the judge’s private review); State v. Buckner, 527 S.E.2d
307, 314 (N.C. 2000) (requiring trial counsel to turn over documents to the state); Binney v.
State 683 S.E.2d 478, 480–81 (S.C. 2009) (permitting trial counsel to meet with the
prosecution).
194. See, e.g., Wharton, 127 F.3d at 1207 (reversing the district court’s order to keep trial
counsel from meeting with the prosecution).
195. See, e.g., Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at
*2–3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence the
government received from trial counsel).
196. See infra Part II.A.1.
197. See infra Part II.A.2.
198. See infra Part II.A.3.
199. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp. 551, 558–59 (D. Utah 1995) aff’d, 297
F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2002) (using the self-defense exception to justify informal interviews);
State v. Click, 768 So. 2d 417, 422 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (finding that the self-defense
exception justifies compelling trial counsel to testify at an evidentiary hearing); Binney v.
State, 683 S.E.2d 478, 481 (S.C. 2009) (using the self-defense exception to excuse trial
counsel’s giving his file to the state).
200. Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel’s
Ethical Duty to the Capital Defendant, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2003).
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believes it necessary.201 Under the Model Rules, the self-defense exception
allows for disclosure not only during a proceeding in court, but at any time
in response to any allegation of misconduct, regardless of whether a charge
has been brought or a proceeding has commenced.202 Courts permit out of
court disclosures to the prosecution in self-defense through affidavits or
informal meetings with the prosecution based on the plain meaning of the
self-defense exception under Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), or the corresponding
provision in that jurisdiction’s ethical rules.203 Two notable cases in which
the court used the self-defense exception to justify trial counsel’s revealing
information and allowed a lawyer to make broad disclosures are Bullock v.
Carver204 and Binney v. State.205
In Bullock, the defendant raised ineffectiveness claims against his trial
counsel in a petition for postconviction relief.206 By the time the petition
was filed, one attorney who had participated in the defense at trial began
working for the Utah Attorney General.207 Although she had been screened
out of the case, the state bar advised her that she should be able to defend
against petitioners’ attacks, and the state court issued an order allowing her
to do so through informal interviews and in-court testimony.208 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah, after reviewing the petition, deemed
the order valid.209 Based on the plain meaning of the self-defense
exception to the state’s confidentiality rule, which mirrors Rule 1.6(b)(5),
the court found that the lawyer was justified in refuting the ineffectiveness
claims.210
Similarly, in Binney, the South Carolina Supreme Court looked to the
plain meaning of the self-defense exception to allow trial counsel to assist
the government.211 In that case, the defendant, Jonathan Kyle Binney,
applied for postconviction relief in state court and accused his trial lawyer
of being ineffective at trial.212 A South Carolina statute provides that a
lawyer accused of rendering ineffective assistance may freely discuss and
disclose any aspect of the representation at issue with the government to
defend against allegations, to the extent necessary to do so.213
Binney’s former lawyer met with the South Carolina Attorney General’s
Office and provided them with a copy of his entire trial file for Binney’s
case.214 Because the defendant made numerous broad ineffectiveness
claims, the trial lawyer concluded that it was necessary for the state to
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009).
See id. R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. [10].
See, e.g., Bullock, 910 F.Supp. at 557–58; Binney, 683 S.E.2d at 481.
910 F. Supp. 551.
683 S.E.2d 478.
See Bullock, 910 F. Supp. at 552.
See id.
See id. at 555–57.
See id. at 557.
Id. at 557–58.
Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478 (S.C. 2009).
See id. at 479.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-130 (1996).
See Binney, 683 S.E.2d at 480.
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examine his entire file.215 When the defendant sought to suppress the
evidence from his former lawyer’s revelations, the court denied the
defendant’s motion.216 To make that determination, the court looked to the
intent of the legislature and the plain meaning of the statute to determine
whether the disclosures were permissible.217 The court concluded that
Binney’s lawyer was permitted to turn his whole file over to the state for
review where he thought it was necessary to do so.218
2. Finding Waiver in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Some courts reject challenges to trial counsel’s assisting the prosecution
based on the theory that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a broad
implied waiver219 of the attorney-client privilege, and that this waiver
extends to information that is generally confidential but not privileged.220
An implied waiver occurs when a client puts his communications with his
attorney at issue.221 When a defendant brings a habeas corpus petition and
alleges that trial counsel gave deficient advice, he is putting their
communications at issue.222 The defendant thus impliedly waives the
privilege with respect to those communications, and may not then insist that
his former lawyer remain silent about them.223 The extent of the waiver is
therefore determined by the breadth and nature of the ineffectiveness
allegations, and because some defendants raise numerous ineffectiveness
claims, courts permit their former lawyers to disclose a significant amount
of confidential information, not only limited to attorney-client
215. See id. at 479 (explaining that the claims were too numerous to determine exactly
which parts of the file were necessary to respond to them).
216. See id. at 480.
217. See id. at 480–81.
218. See id. It is noteworthy that the dissent opined that, while the statute permits
disclosures, it does not say anything about handing over entire files to the state. See id. at
481–82 (Pleicones, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice concluded that trial counsel’s
actions in this case exceeded the scope of the self-defense exception under the South
Carolina statute. See id.
219. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (discussing implied waiver of the
attorney-client privilege).
220. See, e.g., Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that
ineffectiveness claims waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications
related to those claims); Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967)
(same); Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at *2–3
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2009) (denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his former counsel’s
117-page affidavit based on the theory that ineffective assistance of counsel claims waived
the attorney-client privilege); State v. Taylor, 393 S.E.2d 801, 806–07 (N.C. 1990).
221. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375,
377 (5th Cir. 1940) (finding that, when “a client charges his counsel with misconduct and
discharges them . . . . [h]e waives the privilege of the communication by himself making it
an issue to be tried and testifying about it”); Levine, supra note 126, at 791–92; see also
supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (discussing implied waiver of the attorney-client
privilege).
222. See In re Dean, 711 A.2d 257, 259 (N.H. 1998) (“Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel go to the core of attorney-client communications.”).
223. See Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470; Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2003);
Laughner, 373 F.2d at 327.
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communications (which are privileged).224 These courts allow disclosure of
not only information protected by the attorney-client privilege, but also
other information outside the scope of the privilege that is protected by the
broader confidentiality rule.225 For example, courts in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit have found that, because a defendant waives
the attorney-client privilege with ineffectiveness claims, the accused lawyer
may provide “testimony, affidavits, or briefs” that contain any information
to rebut the ineffectiveness claims.226 Some courts only permit trial counsel
to cooperate with the prosecution outside of an evidentiary hearing under
close judicial supervision, through in camera review.227 In these cases,
when a defendant raises broad ineffectiveness claims, the court will perform
an in camera review to determine which parts are irrelevant to the precise
claims raised in the petition and then give the relevant files to the
government.228
One example of such a case is Coluccio v. United States.229 In Coluccio,
the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court and sought
relief based on the claim that his trial lawyer, Andrew J. Weinstein, was
ineffective.230 Weinstein requested to submit an affidavit in which he
would disclose certain confidential information that he believed was
necessary to defend himself against the defendant’s claims.231 The Eastern
District of New York stated that a client cannot use the attorney-client
privilege as both “‘a shield and a sword’”232 and that a defendant who
claims to have relied on the advice of counsel has waived the attorney-client
privilege with respect to the communicated advice.233 The court looked to
other similar Second Circuit cases, which all relied on the “shield and
sword” waiver theory and permitted a lawyer to present evidence in his own
224. See Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1994) (allowing trial counsel to turn
over the former client’s entire file to the state to assist in responding to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims); Waldrip v. Head, 532 S.E.2d 380, 386 (Ga. 2000) (“[A]ny waiver of the
attorney-client privilege is not limited solely to the attorney’s testimony, but extends also to
documents in trial counsel’s files.”).
225. See Reed, 640 So. 2d at 1097 (finding a waiver of the privilege also extended to a
waiver of protection of other materials); Waldrip, 532 S.E.2d at 386 (same).
226. See, e.g., Bloomer v. United States, 162 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[O]ur cases
require that ‘except in highly unusual circumstances,’ the assertedly ineffective attorney
should be afforded ‘an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live
testimony, affidavits, or briefs.’” (quoting Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.
1998) (per curiam))); see also Cox v. Donnelly, 387 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2004); McKee v.
United States, 167 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999).
227. In camera review refers to a judge’s private review of evidence in his chambers. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009).
228. See, e.g., Coluccio v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2003);
State v. Lewis, 36 So. 3d 72, 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Buckner, 527 S.E.2d 307,
314 (N.C. 2000).
229. 289 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
230. See id. at 304.
231. See id. Weinstein wrote a letter to the court requesting permission to make
revelations before actually drafting such an affidavit, and the government requested that the
court rule on the ethical issues implicated by the letter. See id.
232. Id. (quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)).
233. See id.
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defense through “testimony, affidavits, or briefs” containing information
about the course of representation.234 Ultimately the court admitted
Weinstein’s affidavit.235
Another way a court tries to limit disclosure to the government is by
ordering that any parts of files trial counsel hands over to the prosecution be
kept from anyone but the parties working on the prosecution’s case.236 In
Bittaker v. Woodward, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
permitted disclosures to the prosecution, but limited the use of such
information to the Attorney General.237
3. Refusing To Enforce Confidentiality Outside of the Courtroom
In an alternative approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has found that, because the attorney-client privilege does not apply
outside of the courtroom, trial counsel is free to provide information to the
prosecution in an informal setting.238 In Wharton v. Calderon, the Ninth
Circuit declined to interfere with trial counsel’s informal meetings with the
prosecution.239 In that case, the defendant petitioning for postconviction
relief sought an order forbidding trial counsel from having an ex parte
meeting with the prosecution.240 However, the Ninth Circuit noted that
courts do not have the power to regulate the extent to which trial counsel
makes out-of-court disclosures to the prosecution, particularly because
attorneys facing ineffectiveness claims are no longer appearing before the
court.241 Such regulation, the court decided, would unfairly prejudice the
prosecution by preventing access to information.242 Furthermore, because
the court’s responsibility to protect the attorney-client privilege exists only
within the courtroom, the court refused to regulate what an attorney could
do outside the courtroom.243 The court noted that there is no explicit ethical
rule that prohibits one attorney from interviewing another, and that
regulating attorney conduct outside of the courtroom is the State Bar’s
responsibility.244 Thus, informal, unregulated meetings between trial

234. See supra note 226 (listing Second Circuit cases).
235. See Coluccio, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
236. See generally Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
protective order that permitted only representatives of the state to use information in defense
counsel’s files for the sole purpose of responding to ineffective assistance claims).
237. See id. at 717, 728.
238. See Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1997).
239. See id. at 1206–07 (finding that the district court erroneously issued a protective
order that prohibited trial counsel from meeting with the state to defend against
ineffectiveness claims).
240. See id. at 1202–03.
241. See id. at 1206.
242. See id. at 1203; see also Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 722 (citing fairness as a reason to
allow disclosure).
243. See Wharton, 127 F.3d at 1205 (“[A] court’s authority to ‘protect’ the attorney-client
privilege simply does not extend, at least absent some compelling circumstance, to noncompelled, voluntary, out-of-court interviews, any more than it does to an after-dinner
conversation.”).
244. See id. at 1206.
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counsel and the government were permissible.245 The court was not
concerned about the prospect of the prosecution inducing Wharton’s
lawyers to violate any ethics rules.246
B. Devoted to the Defense: The Commentator View
Although courts permit trial counsel to assist the prosecution,
commentators urge lawyers to remain loyal to their former clients. These
commentators find that, instead, a lawyer has the professional responsibility
to assist successor defense counsel in petitioning for ineffective assistance
of counsel relief.247 This section first examines the commentary that urges
a lawyer to protect confidentiality by not cooperating with the
prosecution.248 Then, this section presents the commentary that states that
the duty to provide information requires trial counsel to assist
postconviction counsel.249
1. Confidentiality as a Limit to Self-Defense
Commentators who urge former counsel to refrain from assisting the
prosecution rely on the ethical duty of confidentiality.250 Confidentiality
obligations promote trust between a lawyer and his client, and a lack of
trust hinders the lawyer’s ability to make informed strategic decisions about
the representation.251
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility (Pennsylvania Committee) has analyzed the
issue of whether former defense counsel may assist the prosecution by
considering the ethical duty of confidentiality.252 The Pennsylvania
Committee drafted an opinion in response to a case in which the
government made a discovery request for trial counsel’s entire file, which
would help the state to respond to a habeas petition that asserted ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.253 In light of the relevant confidentiality
considerations of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine,
and the ethical duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6, the
Pennsylvania Committee determined that the file should remain protected
from the government’s discovery requests.254

245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See generally Fox, supra note 200 (describing capital defense lawyers’ obligations
during collateral proceedings); Siegel, supra note 172. (advocating the view that trial counsel
should assist successor counsel during collateral proceedings).
248. See infra Part II.B.1.
249. See infra Part II.B.2.
250. See supra Part I.B.1.a–b (discussing the ethical duty of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege).
251. See supra notes 99–101 (discussing policy justifications for confidentiality rules).
252. See generally Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Informal Op. 72 (2002).
253. See id.
254. See id. at 6.
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First, the Pennsylvania Committee looked to several notable cases that
hold that an ineffectiveness claim waives the attorney-client privilege.255
Second, the Pennsylvania Committee looked to the work product doctrine,
and found that an attorney’s work product was discoverable if it was the
basis of a lawsuit.256 Third, the Pennsylvania Committee noted that Model
Rule 1.6 protects all information relating to representation, and that under
Rule 1.6, counsel may not reveal the client’s file without the client’s
consent or a court order to do so.257 In addition to Rule 1.6’s requirements,
the Pennsylvania Committee concluded that it would be extremely difficult
to determine which records would be useful and directly responsive to the
ineffectiveness allegations.258 Therefore, defense counsel may present any
potentially responsive files to the Court for in camera review to ensure that
confidential materials remain confidential.259 Otherwise, the government
still had the opportunity to call trial counsel as a witness in an evidentiary
hearing.260 It would be unacceptable for the government to be able to “take
a short-cut and seek a whole-sale inspection of” client files, because those
records are protected under Rule 1.6.261 Thus, the Pennsylvania Committee
concluded that the ethical duty of confidentiality would preclude
predecessor counsel’s substantial assistance to the prosecution in such
cases.262
Professor David M. Siegel has briefly discussed a lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality as a limit to the ability to respond to ineffectiveness
claims.263 He acknowledges that an ineffectiveness claim effects some
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of
confidentiality, but says the self-defense exception itself is confusing
because it seems to enable lawyers to respond to ineffectiveness claims
based on a few different rationales (as a disclosure adverse to the client, as a
dispute concerning lawyers’ conduct, or as a former client issue).264 To
provide clearer guidance to lawyers, Siegel proposes an amendment to the
comments of Model Rule 1.6, which would specifically address
ineffectiveness claims and permit disclosure “to the extent necessary to

255. See id. at 2–4 (citing Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1179 (11th Cir. 2001);
Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2000); Tasby v. United States,
504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Williams, 812 F. Supp. 1400, 1433 (E.D. Va.
1993); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 414 (Pa. 1999)).
256. See id. at 5 (citing In re John Doe, v. United States, 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981);
Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127, 130 (M.D.N.C. 1989);
Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
257. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing confidentiality).
258. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op.
72, at 6 (2002).
259. See id.
260. See id. at 7.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 108–11.
264. See id. at 109 (“Unfortunately, the concerns which the Model Rules address
regarding disclosures point in different directions in the postconviction context.”).
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meet the standard of reasonably effective assistance set forth in
Strickland.”265
Siegel is the only commentator who specifically examines the selfdefense exception to the confidentiality rule as justification for responding
to ineffectiveness claims. The few commentators who have made even
fleeting acknowledgements to a lawyer’s ability to defend against
ineffectiveness claims agree that a lawyer should resist the urge to protect
his reputation and remain loyal to his former client.266 As John Wesley
Hall, Jr. explains, being accused of being ineffective is a reality of the
profession, and lawyers should not take such allegations personally.267 He
urges trial counsel to be candid with the court and be honest during
proceedings if the lawyer believes he rendered ineffective assistance, even
if it means admitting to incompetent conduct.268 A lawyer may be
somewhat embarassed, provided his peers read about the court’s decision,
but otherwise, an ineffectiveness claim poses little threat to a lawyer’s
career.269
2. Finding a Duty To Assist the Defense in the Duty To Protect Former
Clients’ Interests
Commentators who discuss a lawyer’s postconviction duties agree that a
lawyer should assist successor counsel in asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.270 Under this view, the ethical rules “impose a duty upon
trial counsel to fully and candidly discuss matters relating to the
representation of the client” with successor counsel, even if doing so would
disclose that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.271 This may be
achieved by maintaining records of the case in a way that will “inform
successor counsel of all significant developments relevant to the litigation,”
giving successor counsel full access to the client’s files, “sharing potential

265. Id. at 111.
266. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 30, at 95–108 (arguing that a lawyer’s ethical duties
limit his ability to respond to ineffectiveness claims); Voigts, supra note 58, at 1131–32
(mentioning a lawyer’s duty to remain loyal to his former client by assisting habeas counsel).
267. See HALL, supra note 31, § 10.1 n.7 (“We chose this line of work, and we need to
accept the risks that come with it. Therefore, defense lawyers should not take
[ineffectiveness claims] personally.”); see also Judge Anthony K. Black & Susan S.
Matthey, Advice to the Criminal Bar:
Preparing Effectively for Allegations of
Ineffectiveness, FLA. B.J., May 2008, at 49, 50 (warning that postconviction ineffectiveness
allegations are “nearly inevitable” for criminal defense attorneys).
268. See HALL, supra note 31, § 10.68.
269. Koniak, supra note 17, at 10 (noting that a lawyer who is found to be ineffective
suffers very few consequences as a result because of the collateral estoppel rule and a lack of
discipline for attorneys who are found to be ineffective).
270. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 108 (urging trial counsel to “fully, openly, and without
reservation cooperate with postconviction counsel”); Siegel, supra note 172, at 14; Voigts,
supra note 58, at 1131. See generally Fox, supra note 200.
271. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
127 (1992), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FxYHJ4sE3
Ws%3d&tabid=839 (discussing trial counsel’s postconviction duties).
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further areas of legal and factual research with successor counsel,” and
cooperating with successor counsel’s legal strategies.272
Those who believe trial counsel must assist successor counsel base this
conclusion in part on the continuing obligation to protect former clients’
interests.273 A lawyer who represents a defendant in a collateral proceeding
has the responsibility to explore all possible grounds for relief.274
Providing full assistance to successor counsel will allow successor counsel
to make a thorough investigation of potential ineffectiveness claims.275
Failure to do so may result in meritless habeas proceedings because a
legitimate ineffectiveness claim is unfounded.276 Thus, the trial lawyer who
refuses to cooperate harms the client’s potential for relief, and by harming
the client, counsel violates the duty to protect a client’s interests that
persists even after the attorney-client relationship terminates.277
Some find the duty to assist successor counsel in the duty to give a
former client access to files relating to representation278 includes not only
giving copies of the files that exist, but also filling in any informational
gaps that exist in the files.279 This means that former counsel must “spend
all the time that is necessary to bring habeas counsel up to speed.”280 This
theory is based on the idea that both the lawyers’ opinions and strategies are
work product that belongs to the client.281
Some commentators interpret this duty as a duty to volunteer thoughts
about strategy relating to representation as well.282 The California State
Bar has said that, where successor counsel needs information that has not
been put into writing, trial counsel must provide this information to his
former client and successor counsel.283 The California State Bar’s Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (California
Committee) addressed the precise issue of the extent to which a criminal
defense trial counsel should cooperate with successor counsel in the context
272. Siegel, supra note 172, at 20.
273. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 95–96; Voigts, supra note 58, at 1130–31.
274. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 96 (“[S]trict new rules on the availability of successive
collateral proceedings impose rigid requirements on the lawyer who represents the defendant
in the collateral action to raise every potential ground for relief.”).
275. See id. at 106–07; Voigts, supra note 58, at 1131.
276. See Voigts, supra note 58, at 1130–31.
277. See id. at 1131; see also Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility &
Conduct,
Formal
Op.
No.
127
(1992),
available
at
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FxYHJ4sE3Ws%3d&tabid=839
(interpreting an ethics rule requiring an attorney to release all client papers and property to
client upon termination to include all impressions, conclusions, opinions, research, etc.).
278. See supra notes 169–82 and accompanying discussion.
279. See Fox, supra note 200, at 1190–91; Siegel, supra note 30, at 112–13; Siegel, supra
note 172, at 20.
280. Fox, supra note 200, at 1191.
281. See supra notes 174–78 (discussing a lawyer’s duty to allow a former client to
access his entire file).
282. See Fox, supra note 200, at 1191–92; Siegel, supra note 30, at 114; Siegel, supra
note 172, at 20.
283. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
127 (1992) available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FxYHJ4
sE3Ws%3d&tabid=839.
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of the duty to return property upon termination.284 The California
Committee concluded that, not only must trial counsel turn over to the
client written materials generated throughout the duration of their
relationship, but he must also provide the client with “other information not
reduced to writing” if failing to provide such information would prejudice
the client.285 A lawyer’s “impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal
research, and legal theories prepared in the client’s underlying case
ordinarily are ‘reasonably necessary to the client’s representation,’” and
must be provided to the former client.286
III. THE PROPER RESPONSE: PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY
Even though courts consistently permit trial defense counsel to disclose
confidential information to refute ineffectiveness claims,287 these courts
disregard the importance of preserving confidentiality to serve judicial
efficiency. Thus, lawyers and courts alike should acknowledge that a
lawyer’s ethical obligations require that he keep confidences and refrain
from defending against ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Part III.A
argues that, in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, a lawyer or
court may not use the self-defense exception to justify trial counsel’s
assisting the prosecution to respond to ineffective assistance of counsel
attacks. Part III.B argues that, not only should trial counsel refrain from
cooperating with the prosecution, but he must also provide a limited degree
of assistance to successor defense counsel.
A. Trial Counsel Should Not Assist the Prosecution
Courts that permit defense counsel to provide substantial assistance to the
prosecution, either because they apply the self-defense exception288 or
because they find ineffectiveness claims waive the attorney-client privilege
and conflate the privilege with the rule,289 fail to perform a thorough
analysis of ethical duties. They do not base these decisions on actual
ethical considerations; rather, they subordinate these considerations to
address prosecutorial and judicial convenience. This section argues that,
because the self-defense exception is meant to apply in very limited
situations, and because the collateral impact of ineffectiveness claims on
defense counsel is minimal, the self-defense exception should never be used
to justify disclosures in response to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
This section also argues that, although ineffectiveness claims may waive the
attorney-client privilege,290 they do not waive the confidentiality duty, so
trial counsel should not disclose confidential information outside of an
284. See generally id. (answering the question, “To what extent must a criminal defense
attorney, having been relieved by successor counsel, cooperate with new counsel?”).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text.
288. See supra Part II.A.1 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary hearing. Lastly, this section argues that permitting outside
cooperation with the prosecution undermines policy considerations that
underlie the ethical duty of confidentiality.
1. The Self-Defense Exception Should Not Apply to
Ineffectiveness Claims
No matter how much an attack on his work offends a lawyer, it is
improper for him to invoke the self-defense exception to justify responding
to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The self-defense exception291
permits a lawyer to disclose confidential information “to establish a claim
or defense . . . in a controversy between the lawyer and the client . . . or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding.”292 It is intended to mitigate the
substantial negative effects that keeping confidences may have on the
lawyer’s interests.293 In instances when the self-defense exception is meant
to apply, such as in response to a disciplinary charge,294 in response to a
civil malpractice claim,295 or in an action to collect a fee,296 the potential
harms to the lawyer are significant (disbarment, financial loss, etc.). In
contrast, the harms a lawyer seeks to avert by defending against ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are minimal.297 Therefore, ineffectiveness
claims are not a controversy for which a lawyer should invoke the
exception.298
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raise three collateral concerns for
lawyers. The first concern is the prospect of a civil malpractice suit; the
second is the prospect of a disciplinary hearing; and the third is the potential
for reputational harm.299 None of these concerns is realistic or serious
enough to warrant the self-defense exception. First, there is no threat of a
civil malpractice claim because of the collateral estoppel rule, which bars a
defendant whose ineffectiveness claim fails from suing his former lawyer
for malpractice.300 Second, while some states require that all findings on
ineffective assistance of counsel be reported to the state ethics board,
lawyers are rarely disciplined for being ineffective.301 Therefore, the only
threat an ineffective assistance claim poses to the accused lawyer is a
damaged reputation.302 Any reputational injury only occurs if others read

291. See supra Part I.B.1.d.
292. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009)).
293. See supra notes 128–39 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
298. The ABA has recently issued an opinion adopting a similar position. See generally
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 456 (2010).
299. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (addressing possible collateral effects
of ineffectiveness claims).
300. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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the court opinion vacating the defendant’s sentence.303 Even if other
lawyers and future clients do gain access to such an opinion, the opinion is
still unlikely to be taken seriously enough to cause serious reputational
harm. Ineffectiveness claims are common in habeas petitions, particularly
among those filed by capital defendants.304 As such, an ineffectiveness
claim is an accepted risk associated with becoming a criminal defense
attorney,305 so there is little stigma attached to being the target of such
claims.
An important example of where a lawyer tried to use the self-defense
exception to protect his reputation is the Louima case discussed in Part I.306
In that case, the lawyers who had revealed confidential information claimed
that they did so to protect their reputations after being publicly accused of
misconduct.307 However, the court found that, even though the lawyers
responded to very public allegations, the threat to their reputation was
insufficient to overcome their duty of confidentiality to their former
client.308 Generally, allegations of ineffectiveness are not nearly as public
as the newspaper articles in Louima.309 Therefore, the self-defense
exception should not justify revealing confidential information in response
to potential humiliation.
To further understand why the self-defense exception does not apply in
response to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is useful to compare
an ineffectiveness claim to an action to recover a fee. As discussed in Part
I, the Restatement’s guidelines for disclosure in a fee dispute are more lax
than those for disclosure when defending against charges of wrongful
conduct.310 In a suit to recover a fee, a lawyer may divulge information to
the extent reasonably necessary to establish his claim.311 For other
situations in which the self-defense exception may arise, a lawyer may
reveal information only if he believes it is necessary to do so and that belief
is objectively reasonable, and he may not reveal information to respond to
casual charges not likely to be taken seriously by others.312 Before
deciding to reveal confidential client information, the lawyer must
reasonably believe that he has exhausted his other options, that those other
options will be unavailing, or that invoking them would substantially
prejudice the lawyer’s position in the matter.313 Thus, making disclosures
to defend oneself should be a last resort response to an imminent charge and
not to a commonplace claim of ineffectiveness.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28, 267, and accompanying text.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 145.
See supra text accompanying note 148.
See supra text accompanying note 144.
See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
Seee supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. e (2000).
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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Waive the Testimonial
Privilege, But Do Not Discharge the Ethical Duty
It is a well-accepted principle that an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim that puts the attorney’s conversations with his client at issue
impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to those
communications.314 However, some courts have interpreted that waiver to
extend not only to communications between the lawyer and the client, but
to other information relating to representation.315 Courts that allow or
require lawyers to have ex parte meetings with the prosecution or submit
affidavits or entire files,316 justifying the decision with a theory of waiver,
mistakenly conflate the attorney-client privilege and the duty of
confidentiality. This practice is improper because there are critical
distinctions between the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of
confidentiality317 that courts (and all parties, for that matter) should not
ignore.
The attorney-client privilege only applies in very limited
circumstances, protecting attorney-client communications during a judicial
proceeding.318 The ethical duty of confidentiality is much broader; it
protects all information relating to representation at all times.319 Therefore,
attorneys should not volunteer, nor should courts order them to turn over,
entire files on the theory that ineffectiveness claims waive the attorneyclient privilege.320 Entire folders are distinctly different from information
about select conversations between a defendant and his lawyer, which
courts and lawyers should acknowledge.
3. Policy Implications of the Defense Cooperating with the Prosecution
Under either the self-defense exception or the theory of waiver, allowing
a lawyer to provide information to the prosecution outside of an evidentiary
hearing321 poses a great danger that the lawyer will overdisclose
confidential information. This undermines the policy interests that the
confidentiality rule seeks to advance.322 When a lawyer hands over a file or
agrees to an ex parte meeting with the prosecution,323 the lawyer risks
disclosing far more information than necessary because he does not know
precisely what information the reviewing judge will need to decide the case.
Therefore, it would be unacceptable for trial counsel to voluntarily disclose
information to the prosecution without being compelled to do so by a court
order.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See supra notes 113, 116–18, 221–23 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes104–06 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.a.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
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Even in instances where courts do seek to limit disclosure to the
prosecution by requiring in camera review of trial counsel’s files,
affidavits, and other statements,324 this practice does little to guard against
overdisclosure when the revelations are initially made to the judge. Where
a lawyer turns his entire file over to a judge for in camera review, a breach
of confidentiality occurs at the moment the lawyer reveals his file to the
judge, regardless of whether the prosecution eventually views it. If a judge
is to determine what information he needs to decide an ineffectiveness
claim, then a lawyer has no way of knowing precisely what information he
should disclose to the court for in camera review. Therefore, the lawyer
will inevitably disclose more information than is reasonably necessary to
defend himself.
Because of the dangers of overdisclosure through less formal means of
providing the court with evidence, a lawyer should not provide the
prosecution with information relating to representation of his former client
until the court orders an evidentiary hearing.325 As the Pennsylvania
Committee found, an evidentiary hearing will give the government ample
opportunity to elicit and present evidence by cross-examining trial counsel
with close judicial oversight to limit such information to what is necessary
for the judge to rule on the petition.326 Trial counsel must always take care
to protect what is confidential and err on the side of nondisclosure, even in
situations where a court orders him to make disclosures.327 This is the best
way to ensure confidential information is protected.
If judges and lawyers disregard the defense lawyer’s duty to keep from
assisting the prosecution outside of an evidentiary hearing, that disregard
will have detrimental effects on the attorney-client relationship and the trust
that confidentiality protections foster.328 Whenever a court permits a
defense lawyer to assist the prosecution, it perpetuates the feelings of
mistrust and skepticism many defendants have towards their attorneys.329
When a defendant petitioning for relief learns that his former lawyer
disclosed confidential information not only to the judge, but to the
prosecution, without his consent, he will trust his collateral counsel less.
More generally, a policy that would permit a lawyer to do so would further
discourage criminal defendants from confiding in their lawyers330 if they
know there exists a practice of revealing confidences in response to
ineffectiveness claims.331 This erosion of confidentiality and client trust
would undermine truth-seeking and the integrity of the adversarial process.
One may argue that keeping information from the prosecution would
unfairly prejudice the government.332 However, as mentioned earlier, the
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See supra notes 227–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 260.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–101, 109–10, and accompanying text.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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government (and the judge) may obtain all of the information it needs to
answer a habeas petition during an evidentiary hearing.333
B. Trial Counsel Should Assist Successor Defense Counsel
Not only does trial counsel have the duty to diligently protect the
confidences of his former client and refrain from assisting the
prosecution,334 he must also provide at least some assistance to successor
defense counsel.335 This duty, which is not a choice but a requirement, is
apparent in the duties to protect a former client’s interests, even after
representation has ended.336
Trial counsel should take care not to harm his former client and should
provide information that would be useful in asserting ineffectiveness
claims.337 Successor counsel has a duty to investigate fully the claims a
defendant wishes to make and to advocate zealously for the defendant’s
interests, just as any lawyer has with respect to any current client.338 The
effectiveness of successor counsel depends on trial counsel’s willingness to
assist.339 The trial lawyer who refuses to assist his former client risks
harming the defendant’s interests by hindering successor counsel’s
investigation of possible claims.340 By providing information to successor
counsel, a lawyer will facilitate the fact-finding process and ensure that a
habeas petition does not contain any frivolous, unfounded claims.341
However, this duty to provide information that will help substantiate
claims is governed by a lawyer’s interpretation of the duty to turn over the
client file when the attorney-client relationship ends.342
As the
commentators point out, the duty to assist successor counsel is also found in
the duty to turn over property to the client upon termination.343 The Model
Rules and Restatement require a lawyer to provide at least some assistance
to his former client by providing the client with files and documents
relating to representation.344 A lawyer may only retain such information if
there are substantial grounds for refusing to do so.345 An ineffective
assistance allegation is hardly substantial grounds for refusing to turn over
documents because, as already discussed, these claims, unlike an unpaid
fee, do not significantly threaten a lawyer’s interests.

333. See supra notes 53–56, 260, and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part III.A.
335. See supra Part II.B (discussing commentator support for the duty to assist successor
defense counsel).
336. See supra Parts I.B.2, II.B.
337. See supra notes 273–77.
338. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 270–77 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
342. See supra Part I.B.2.
343. See supra Part II.B.2.
344. See supra notes 167–73 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
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Some believe this duty to provide information to the former client
includes strategizing with successor defense counsel and volunteering any
gaps in information that exist in the defendant’s file.346 However, the
bounds of the applicable ethical rules are not clear. Commentators
overstate the duty to assist successor counsel in interpreting that duty as an
absolute duty to strategize with and be prepared as a witness by the
defendant’s new lawyer. Trial counsel is not required to sit down and
strategize with successor counsel; rather, if he so chooses, he may only
provide successor counsel with files and documents relating to
representation, limiting that information to written work product.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers ought to be aware of their ethical duties to their former clients,
even in the face of attacks on their work. For many defendants, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are a last chance for relief. While it may be
tempting for trial counsel to defend against ineffectiveness claims,
especially those he feels lack merit, his ability to do so is limited by the
ethical duties he owes to his former client. As this Note explained, a lawyer
must protect confidential information and refrain from viewing the selfdefense exception as justifying cooperation with the prosecution, despite
various courts finding otherwise. Furthermore, a lawyer must continue to
zealously protect his former client’s interests by providing successor
defense counsel with at least a minimal degree of assistance to adequately
protect his former client’s interests.

346. See supra notes 271–72, 278–86 and accompanying text.

